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WALTER RUSSELL MEAD: POWER, TERROR, PEACE,
AND WAR: STUDY GUIDE, 2006-2008
Steven Alan Samson
INTRODUCTION
Overview
Walter Russell Mead places his latest volume (which builds on Special Providence) into the
context of the ideological and theological debates that have shaped American history. Like
Michael Oakeshott and various conservatives, Mead depicts the contemporary world as the
outworking of a “modern temper” or an “Enlightenment project,” two phases of which he focuses
on: Fordism (resembling Lewis Mumford’s modern megamachine) and millennial capitalism.
Mead’s identification of several competing schools of thought or dispositions in chapter six is
somewhat comparable to earlier “models of historical interpretation,” such as Daniel Elazar’s
three American “political cultures” and David Hackett Fischer’s four “British folkways” in America.
The key to understanding Mead’s complex and sophisticated analysis of American foreign policy
is to pay careful attention to how he defines his terminology, how he distinguishes between the
major political and cultural dispositions, how they interact with each other, and how he frames the
issues that been intensifying the current debates over American foreign policy .
Outline
A.

B.

C.

D.

SURPRISE ATTACK (3-6)
1.
Lost Years in American Foreign Policy
a.
Age of Narcissism and Hubris
2.
Unipolar World
3.
Dangers
a.
Democratic View: Republican unilateralism would lose Kyoto and the
International Criminal Court (ICC)
b.
Republican View: Democratic fecklessness on defense would open the
door to a challenge from China and fail to build a missile defense system
4.
Prevailing Illusion: Only One Effective Will (Ours) Operated in the World
(Monotheletism=heretical doctrine that Christ had two natures but only one will)
5.
The Real Situation
a.
Radical Muslim Mass Movement
b.
Fraying Alliances
c.
Anti-Americanism
AMERICA IS BITTERLY DIVIDED ON FOREIGN POLICY (6-7)
1.
Unremitting Months of International Crisis Since 9/11
2.
Agonizing Mix of Reactions Among America’s Enemies and Friends: Sympathy,
Anger, Incredulity, Hostility
THE IDEA OF AN AMERICAN PROJECT (7-8)
[The latest iteration of the idea of the Enlightenment Project]
1.
Institutionalization of American Power [as an international organization]
2.
Public Support for Building a Safer, Peaceful, Prosperous, and Democratic World
THE CHASM THIS BOOK TRIES TO BRIDGE (8-10)
1.
Need for Generalists in a World of Specialists
2.
Morality of the American Project
3.
Its Failure Would Be Catastrophic

Study Questions
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1.

What were the “lost years in American foreign policy”? What made them that way? What
was the prevailing illusion? (3-5)

2.

What were some of the characteristics of the real situation during that same period? Why
are Americans bitterly divided over foreign policy? What does the author mean by the
“American project”? Why are foreign policy generalists needed? Why does the author,
on the whole, support the American project? (5-10)

Review
unipolarity
the real situation
institutionalization of American power

American project

PART ONE: THE AMERICAN PROJECT
CHAPTER ONE: NO ANGEL IN OUR WHIRLWIND
Overview
The author here articulates a free market perspective by acknowledging that knowledge and
practice in politics, as in economics, are “little subject to conscious control.” The physicist and
philosopher Michael Polanyi explored the problems and philosophy of knowledge (epistemology)
in such books as Personal Knowledge and The Tacit Dimension. Similarly, F. A. Hayek
introduced such concepts as “methodological individualism,” “subjectivism,” and “spontaneous
order” in order to strengthen the case for free market economics.
At the level of political practice, Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn lamented the wide gap between Scita
and Scienda. “As modern life becomes increasingly complicated across many different sociopolitical levels, Kuehnelt-Leddihn submits that the Scita — political, economic, technological,
scientific, military, geographical, psychological knowledge of the masses and their
representatives – and the Scienda – the knowledge of these matters that is necessary to reach
logical-rational-moral conclusions – are separated by an incessantly and cruelly widening gap
and that democratic governments are inadequate to the task.” Source:
http://pedia.nodeworks.com/E/ER/ERI/Erik Ritter von Kuehnelt-Leddihn
Outline
A.

GRAND STRATEGY (13-18)
1.
Carl von Clausewitz on Tactics vs. Strategy
2.
Joseph Addison’s Poem on Marlborough’s Victory at Blenheim
3.
No Angel in the Whirlwind Today (no central guiding intelligence)
a.
Clausewitzian grand strategy requires long-term thinking
(1)
Bismarck could ignore the Reichstag and subordinate the
bureaucracy to his will
b.
Presidents and Congress Lack This Kind of Power
[Lord Macaulay once remarked of the U.S. Constitution that it is all sail
and no anchor; Kuehnelt-Leddihn notes that the American government
suffers from want of a professionally-educated chief executive; others
have noted the lack of continuity due to frequent political turnovers]
4.
Politics Is the Art of the Possible: Public Opinion Determines Its Limits
a.
American Foreign Policy: A Vector of Impulses and Interests
(1)
It is a mall rather than a boutique
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5.

B.

Foreign Policy of the American People
a.
Business World
b.
Media
c.
Private Foreign Policies
6.
The Most Profound Impact of the U.S. on the Rest of the World Is Unconscious
a.
Rippling Effects of Pension Funds, Consumer Choices, Capital Markets
7.
The United States Helps Set the Economic Agenda for the Rest of the World
8.
The Disturbing Messianic Dimension of Grand Strategy
a.
National Messiah Complex Reached a New High with Nuclear Weaponry
b.
The High Stakes Involved with Nuclear Proliferation
OUR OVER-ALL ROLE IS LITTLE SUBJECT TO CONSCIOUS CONTROL (18-20)
1.
We Americans Focus on Specific Issues When We Think About Foreign Policy
2.
The President Shapes Our Engagement with the World [But Tolstoy ends War
and Peace with a theory of history that leaves no room for individual intentions]
3.
Patterns and Structures
4.
Grand Strategy Must Be Inferred
5.
American Grand Strategy Must Be a View of Where American Society Is Headed

Study Questions
1.

How did Clausewitz distinguish strategy from tactics? What is required for long-term
thinking? What factors make this especially difficult to achieve? What role is played by
public opinion and how is it constructed? What are some of the components of the
foreign policy of the American people? (13-16)

2.

Why is the most profound impact of the United States on the rest of the world
unconscious”? What are some of the international rippling effects of decisions that seem
to be driven by purely domestic consideration? Does it appear that the United States
may be regarded as a bull in a China shop? [Some mountains are so high that they are
said to generate their own weather. Likewise, some commentators contend that
quantitative differences breed qualitative ones]. Thought Question: How is the image of
Superman so characteristically American [although changing versions of Superman seem
to reflect changing attitudes]? Do Americans have a coherent view of foreign policy?
How may grand strategy be inferred? (16-20)

Review
Carl von Clausewitz
American foreign policy
role of the president

grand strategy
lack of a central intelligence
unconscious impact of the U.S. national messiah complex

CHAPTER TWO: THE SHAPE OF AMERICAN POWER
Outline
A.

TWO STRIKING FACTS, THREE ALTERNATIVES, AND THE NEW GAME (21-25)
1.
The United States Has Always Been a Global Power [its moods may swing from
extraverted to introverted but it has always acted globally]
a.
Promotion of Global Integration
(1)
Flirtations with Protection
b.
Global Ideological Impulses
c.
Global Trade Creates Global Vulnerabilities and Security Interests
2.
Our Long-Standing Relationship with Another Global Power: Britain
a.
British World System of Empire and Commerce
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b.

B.

C.

Americans Enjoyed Its Benefits without Paying Its Costs [This is what is
unkindly called “sponging”]
(1)
Britain fought colonial wars and maintained the balance of power
in Europe
(2)
Idea of Free Trade
(3)
Investment capital from the London financial markets enabled
American industry to grow
3.
Three Alternatives Following the British Decline
a.
Prop Up the British Empire, Ignore the Problem of World Order, or Do
The Dirty, Expensive Job Ourselves
(1)
Like Britain, America is not the world policeman; it is more of a
gyroscope of world order
4.
The New Game
a.
The United States Can Not Be Another Great Power Playing the Old
Games of Dominance with Rivals and Allies [this is an expression of
what is known as “American exceptionalism”]
b.
Unprecedented Objective
5.
Goal: To Build a New System That Would Put an End to Thousands of Years of
Great Power Conflicts
a.
New Wine Requires New Bottles: The United States lacks the power to
reduce the world’s countries and civilization to the status of tributary
provinces (in the Roman tradition)
6.
Joseph Nye on The Paradox of American Power
a.
Hard Power vs. Soft Power (which makes others want what you want)
[cf. René Girard’s mimetic desire]
7.
Two Types of Hard Power
a.
Sharp: military power
b.
Sticky: economic power
8.
Two Types of Soft Power
a.
Sweet: American values, culture, and policy
b.
Hegemonic (leadership or what Girard refers to as “modeling”): It arises
from the interplay of sharp, sticky, and sweet power all working together
SHARP POWER (26-29)
1.
Ageless Rules of Military Power [understandable by Hittites and the Romans as
well as by Clausewitz]
2.
Monroe Doctrine, 1823: Security Starts at Home [“King’s X” for the New World]
3.
Eurasia: No Single Power Should Dominate the Vast Supercontinent (especially
the eastern and western fringes)
4.
Sea- and Air-Lanes Must Be Secure Against the Interruption of Trade Flows
5.
Middle East: Two Potential Dangers
a.
Outside power (Soviet Union during the Cold War) interfering or gaining
control over oil
b.
A regional power (Egypt, Iran, Iraq) doing the same
6.
Osama bin Laden
a.
Goal: Expel the United States from the region and build a unified,
theocratic state that would control the resources of the Middle East in
order to promote their ideology and power on a global scale
b.
Taliban example: economic stagnation, political oppression, hideous
mistreatment of women
7.
U.S. System of Alliances and Bases: Quarter Million Military Personnel Stationed
Abroad
a.
Intelligence and Surveillance
b.
Objective: Overwhelming Military Superiority
(1)
Deterrent Effect
STICKY POWER (29-36)
1.
Economic: Not Based on Either Compulsion or a Coincidence of Wills
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a.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

Analogy of the Carnivorous Sundew Plant [cf. David Kupelian’s The
Marketing of Evil]
Both Britain and America Built Economic Systems That Attracted Other Countries
a.
America was initially drawn into Britain’s system of trade and investment
(1)
America’s global trade became hostage to the British navy
(2)
There was always a strong lobby against war with Britain; New
England almost seceded during the War of 1812
Germany’s Experience in the First World War
a.
Trade Dependency
b.
Embargo: Sticky Power was Vital to Britain’s Victory [Britain and France
used embargos against each other during the Napoleonic wars]
(1)
Starvation [Herbert Hoover operated a food program in Belgium]
(2)
U-Boat campaign brought the United States into the war
(3)
Collapse of morale among German armed forces and civilians
China
a.
Path to Economic Integration: ensuring that it is attractive enough to
bring China into the system
b.
Mutuality: sticky power works both way
Two Reasons for the Importance of Sticky Power: It Helps Prevent War and, If It
Comes, It Helps Us Win
a.
Old British System was crippled by three blows: two world wars and the
Great Depression
b.
Its reorganization during the Cold War
Two Foundations of the New American System: the international monetary
system and free trade
a.
Bretton Woods agreements, 1944
(1)
Dollar made the central currency in the global system
(2)
The system collapsed in August 1971
(3)
New regime: floating exchange rates
b.
Free Trade
(1)
Legal and economic experts helped build the “invisible infrastructure” of laws and institutions that encouraged investment
Requirement: America’s Willingness to Open Its Markets
a.
Cold War Grand Strategy: Containing Communism in part through
creating a prosperous and integrated noncommunist world
b.
America became “the locomotive of the global economy” and “the
consumer of last resort” [cf. Rushdoony critique]
c.
American trade [balance of payments] deficits stimulated production and
consumption in the rest of the world
Opening Domestic Markets to Foreign Competition
a.
Bitter Opposition [cf. Ross Perot’s “great sucking sound” as industry
moves South]
b.
United States converted from a net international creditor to a net debtor
during the Reagan Administration
The Result: Repetition on a global scale of the conversion of financial debt to
political strength
a.
Two Precedents:
(1)
Founders of the Bank of England in 1694
(2)
Creation of the Bank of the United States in 1791 following the
assumption of state war debts
Bank of England: maintenance of the stability of the government guaranteed the
value of the debt
a.
Fear that a Stuart Restoration would undermine their holdings, wealthy
Englishmen supported the House of Orange
Foreigners Have Acquired a Vested Interest in the Strength of the American
System
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a.

D.

Collapse of the American economy or American power would inflict
enormous, unacceptable damage on the rest of the world
12.
Its Fiduciary [Trust] Character
a.
The Risk: “Pressed too far or used recklessly, a large national debt
can turn from a source of strength to a crippling liability.”
b.
“We have managed to persuade others to trust us with their savings to
an unprecedented degree.”
SWEET POWER (36-40)
1.
Ideals, Culture, Values
2.
Ideals [cf. Minogue: stars to navigate by]
a.
Women’s Rights
b.
Anti-imperialism
c.
Political Democracy
3.
Selective Nature of Their Appeal
a.
Many find the American approach to gender relations repugnant and
frightening
b.
Anticommunism attracted central and eastern Europeans, bur repelled
many west European intellectuals
c.
Universal Human Rights: Some see an agenda of cultural imperialism
4.
Culture
a.
Popular culture: Often hated for its immorality and vulgarity
5.
America’s Role in the World
a.
The private sector has provided the real energy of sweet power
b.
MNCs
6.
Immigration
a.
Foreign students
b.
Remittances sent by immigrants to their families
7.
Humanitarian Assistance
a.
61% comes from the private sector

Study Questions
1.

Was the United States originally introverted? How did America’s long-standing
relationship with the British world system of empire and commerce shape its
development? What were some of the benefits (and cost)? What alternatives did the
United States face in view of Britain’s decline after WWII? What are some of the rules of
the new game the United States has been introducing on the world stage? Distinguish
between two kinds of hard power and two kinds of soft power. (21-25)

2.

What is the purpose of the Monroe Doctrine? What is the strategic goal of the United
States’ exercise of sharp power? How does it pursue this goal? What is Osama bin
Laden’s goal? (26-29)

3.

How does sticky power differ from sharp power (coercion) and sweet power (a
coincidence of wills)? How were America and Germany similarly and differently affected
by Britain’s system of trade and investment? [Both were potential rivals but Germany’s
actions after 1890 posed a more immediate threat]. Why is sticky power so important?
What were the economic and legal foundations of the new American system after WWII?
What was America’s Cold War grand strategy and what sacrifices did it require of the
United States? What kind of entanglements does it specifically generate? How does it
follow the earlier example of the Bank of England and Alexander Hamilton’s economic
policies? What is it fiduciary (fides=faith) character? [The Constitution has a “full faith
and credit” clause that upholds our national debt] (29-36)

4.

Identify some of the forms or expressions of sweet power. What might account for the
selection nature of its appeal? [“Cultural imperialism” is a common charge; the toxic
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character of so much popular culture is often deeply resented. As David Chilton put it: “If
this is a culture it belongs in a Petri dish!”]. Where does most of the energy behind sweet
power come from? (36-40)
Review
United States: a global power
benefits to the United States
the new game
sticky power
Monroe Doctrine
U.S. alliances and bases
why sticky power is important
Bank of England

British world system of empire and commerce
America’s choices following Britain’s decline
hard power vs. soft power
sharp power
sweet power
hegemonic power
Bin Laden’s goal
Taliban’s rule
Germany’s experience with Britain during WWI
Bretton Woods
Cold War grand strategy
role of the private sector

CHAPTER THREE: HEGEMONIC POWER AND
HARMONIC CONVERGENCE
Outline
A.

B.

HEGEMONY (41-44)
1.
Antonio Gramsci
a.
Power of “bourgeois” [middle-class] concepts like parliamentary
democracy
2.
Legitimacy of the Order Is Based on Consent
3.
Hegemonic Power: the power that creates and flows from this consent
a.
Sense of Inevitability: Rooted in military power, technological prowess,
and broad historical development or economic power that cannot be
challenged
4.
Synergy: interplay of sharp, sticky, and sweet power [Althusius set forth the
political theory of synergism in Politica]
a.
U.S. military-to-military ties embracing almost every country [note
National Defense University]
(1)
NATO expansion as an illustration
b.
Middle East
(1)
U.S. interest: maintaining the security of the oil trade
c.
Bottom Line: The sharp power of military American supremacy has
helped create both the sticky power of the world’s integrated energy
market and the sweet power that flows from the reduction of military
competition under the Pax Americana
AMERICA’S KEY DOMESTIC PROJECT: FORDIST PROGRESSIVISM (44-49)
1.
New Kind of Economy, Prosperity, and Democracy: Based on a combination
of mass production and mass consumption
a.
America’s most important export during the Cold War
2.
Fordism: Based on organized mass production and high wages
3.
Social Changes
a.
Laissez-faire government weakened
b.
Unionization encouraged to prevent an anti-capitalist labor movement
c.
Cultural changes that supported mobility and mass consumption
(1)
Anarchic, cutthroat capitalism gave way to the “managerial
revolution” [James Burnham]
d.
Oligopoly: three broadcast networks, one phone company, etc.
e.
Regulation of banks, airlines, and utilities
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4.
5.

C.

White-Collar Managers [C. Wright Mills, William F. Whyte, Jr.]
Progressive Reformers: Patronage appointees of the old spoils system were
increasingly replaced by a professional civil service with life tenure
a.
Role of politicians shrank as government was to be conducted along
objective, scientific principles as revealed by the new social sciences
6.
Civil Service
a.
“In an age of universal suffrage, this system was a way of reconciling
democratic politics with the need of the state to manage sophisticated
enterprises that average voters and elected officials did not appreciate or
understand.”
7.
Educational Establishment: Training and comfortable, well-paying employment
for intellectuals who might otherwise organize revolutions
8.
Fordist Ambition: Means and Ends
a.
Stability and Prosperity
b.
Anti-Trust Laws
c.
Regulated Economy: Protection of Big Companies from Aggressive
Start-Up Rivals [cf. Gabriel Kolko’s The Triumph of Conservatism: for
example, Pure Food and Drug Act protected Swift and Armour against
upstarts that cut corners and gave U.S. meats a bad reputation]
d.
Work: Hard, Monotonous, Rigid, But Better Paid
e.
Petite Bourgeoisie: The broker of the Fordist class compromise
f.
Intellectuals
g.
Social Sciences
9.
Cold War: In Large Part a Competition Between Fordism and Communism
a.
Fordist Advantage: Combination of the dynamism of markets with the
stabilizing effects of government macroeconomic policy and ever more
lavish social safety nets
10.
Pax Americana: Capitalist countries no longer tore themselves apart in recurring
wars under its umbrella
a.
Communist propaganda exploited the misery and instability resulting
from these wars [Lenin’s theory of imperialism is summarized here]
b.
Fordism provided the United States with a persuasive argument that
capitalism is better than communism at bringing peace to the world
11.
American System
12.
Concept of Harmonic Convergence [once used to announce a New Age
spiritual transformation]
a.
The spearhead of capitalism in its ideological war with Communism [e.g.,
the “perfect harmony” of the “world of Coke”: “It’s the real thing”; earlier it
was the Harmonial Philosophy of the 19C American spiritualist, Andrew
Jackson Davis]
THE DOCTRINE OF HARMONIC CONVERGENCE (49-52)
1.
Attractive Implications: Its Idealism
a.
Capitalism creates the social wealth for universal education and mass
affluence
2.
Rockefeller Republicans and Acheson Democrats: American Establishment
envisioned a domestic as well as an international transformation in a more
progressive and cosmopolitan direction
a.
Vision of Eden: Post-Historical [cf. Roderick Seidenberg and Francis
Fukuyama], secular, with a social welfare state à la Western Europe
b.
The result was to be “more intellectually meritocratic [rule by an
educated elite], less driven culturally by the mix of popular taste and
entrepreneurialism. The values of the educated, liberal, and progressive
social engineers would replace the values of the ‘great unwashed.’”
3.
Progress: The rise of the rational and the retreat of the irrational forces in human
nature
a.
Fundamentalism would disappear
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b.

D.

E.

F.

Mainline religious traditions would converge under the gradual progress
of enlightenment
c.
Nationalism would become more “civilized” and nuanced
4.
American Power: Kinder, Gentler, Less Arbitrary
5.
Pax Fordiana Promised a Bright Future for Europe
a.
Economic logic and historical experience suggested that Europe would
catch up to the United States
b.
As our relative economic power declined, we would conduct foreign
policy through increasingly dense networks of institutions; sovereignty
would be pooled; international life, like capitalism at home, would
become less like a jungle and more like a garden party
6.
During the Cold War, this vision looked realistic
a.
European Union seen as the leading edge
7.
This Vision Is Central to the Idea of Progress as It Has Been Understood Since
the Defeat of European Fascism
a.
It Assumed That the United States Would Gradually Become
Domesticated
8.
American Exceptionalism [America as a “City Upon a Hill,” the First New
Nation] Was Expected to Become a Thing of the Past
a.
“The features of the world system that looked like an American empire
were temporary, passing phenomena.” It would dissolve at the end of
history into a liberal, Fordist order
FORDISM AND A SECURITY BLANKET (52-53)
1.
Solution to Europe’s Most Vexing Problems
a.
National and class arrogance exchanged for American security blanket
2.
Hegemony of Bourgeois Democracy: “Fordism choked Marxism (and fascism)
with butter.”
3.
The Trade-Offs: limited national independence for the First World, enhanced
national independence and a development model for the Third World
4.
Centrality of Local Elites: elite-guided large development projects and a statecontrolled credit system
IMAGE OF AN ENDURING ORDER (53-55)
1.
Francis Fukuyama: The End of History and the Last Man [the title evokes Hegel
and Nietzsche]
a.
Liberal Capitalist Democracy: The Culmination of History
2.
The American Project Is a Distinguished Moral Initiative
3.
Crimes and Errors
a.
Support for dictatorial regimes
b.
Uneven benefits
c.
Mixed consequences of development advice
d.
Unfair trade and investment policies
POST-COLD WAR CONFIDENCE (55)
1.
Americans Remain Proud of This History
2.
Collapse of the Soviet Union Was Thought to Remove the Final Obstacle to
Convergence
3.
The Came 9/11

Study Questions
1.

How is hegemony legitimized? What did the Communist intellectual, Antonio Gramsci,
recognize about bourgeois democracy? [This is why he emphasize the strategic
importance of what has been called “the Long March through the institutions”]. What is
the originating power and the synergy that undergird hegemonic power? (41-44)

2.

What was America’s most important export during the Cold War? Why? What are the
chief components of Fordism? What social and cultural changes resulted? What are
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some of their consequences? How were the values of the Progressive reformers
reflected in the new civil service system? In education? What advantage did Fordism
have in the Cold War competition with Communism? What did Progressives seek to
accomplice through the Fordist social welfare state – both domestically and
internationally? How did the Communists fight back? (44-49)
4.

What does the author mean by the concept of harmonic convergence? What made it
attractive, both to the American ruling elite and to others? What evidence of human
progress was commonly antoicipated? What was supposed to happen to American
exceptionalism? (49-52)

5.

How was Fordism supposed to solve Europe’s most vexing problems? Thought
Questions: What do you imagine were some of the consequences of American
deference to local elites? What kind of resentments might have resulted? (52-53)

6.

What was Francis Fukuyama’s vision for the “end of history.” What were some of the
moral failings of this otherwise distinguished moral initiative? What brought it up short?
(53-55)

Review
Antonio Gramsci
Fordism
Fordist means and ends
Pax Americana
American exceptionalism
Francis Fukuyama

hegemonic power
synergy
Fordist social changes
Progressive reformers
Fordist advantage in the Cold War
harmonic convergence
meritocracy
hegemony of bourgeois democracy

PART TWO: THE GATHERING STORM
Overview
“The Gathering Storm” is the title of the first volume of Winston Churchill’s History of the Second
World War. In his earlier work, Mortal Splendor, Mead cites Jeane Kirkpatrick’s quote from that
volume (p. 151): “The Sermon on the Mount is the last word in Christian ethics. Everyone
respects the Quakers. Still, it is not in these terms that Ministers assume their responsibilities of
guiding states.” A rebuttal of sorts is provided in one of Christ’s sermons: “Behold, I send you
forth as sheep in the midst of wolves; be ye therefore wise as serpents, and harmless as doves.”
(Mt. 10:16) The confusions to which many Christians are subject were addressed by the
theologian Reinhold Niebuhr in a number of books on human nature and foreign policy, including
The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness.

CHAPTER FOUR: FAULTY TOWERS
[Title is after a 1975 British comedy, “Fawlty Towers”]
Outline
A.

INNER WEAKNESS AND CONTRADICTIONS (59-62)
1.
Dual Nature of America’s Role in the World
a.
The United States sees itself, accurately, as the chief change agent in
a global revolutionary process spreading liberal capitalism and liberal
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B.

C.

democracy
b.
Conservative Dimension: We want change and stability
c.
“Americans are rarely able to solve these problems elegantly.”
2.
Fall of the Berlin Wall
a.
History Did Not End
b.
Capitalism Is Not Stable and Placid: it is “driven unpredictably but
dynamically by changes in technology, institutions, and practices.”
3.
Perils of Progress
a.
Weapons of Mass Destruction
4.
Progress in Weapons Development Undermines the Efficacy of International
Cooperation for Nonproliferation
a.
“Without progress, the United States would not increasingly face the
wrenching choice of acting unilaterally against proliferators or allowing
states with ties to terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons.”
5.
Potentially Destructive New Technologies
a.
“We are nowhere near the climax of this roller coaster ride.”
b.
Scientists have access to ever-more sophisticated and cheaper
equipment, ever-faster access to information about research
c.
More capital is available in more efficient capital markets, enabling
inventors get backing for promising technologies more quickly
6.
Continual Reinvention of the American Project
a.
We must never turn a blind eye to the revolutionary nature of the
American project or the appalling nature of the threats
TWO STRATEGIES (62-63)
1.
Age-Old Contest of Nations for Dominion and Conquest
a.
Under the conditions of modern warfare, it might wipe out mankind if it
continues
2.
The United States Seeks to Bring This History to an End
a.
Foreigners look with alarm at the way American defines and seeks its
goals; they look at the influence of ethnic lobbies and the growth of
military power
b.
European shock at the lack of consultation
THE AMERICAN SYSTEM FACES TWO DANGERS: TOO LITTLE AND TOO MUCH
POWER (63-69)
1.
The Liberal Hegemon: Effort to maximize consent and consultation without being
seen as seeking permission to act
2.
Tension Between the Imperial and Cooperative Aspects of America’s Role
a.
Importance of International Institutions
(1)
Their usefulness in building stronger and more effective
coalitions
(2)
Their drawbacks: They include countries that do not share
America’s sense of values and priories
3.
Two Groups That Are Out of Step [cf. Reinhold Niebuhr’s The Children of Light
and the Children of Darkness]
a.
Party of Heaven (e.g., countries like Germany and Canada): Goal of a
harmonic convergence that subordinates might to right and a world
Government that puts and end to war [idealism]
b.
Party of Hell (e.g., Russia and France): Goal of limiting American
hegemony from the standpoint of traditional power politics [realism]
4.
The Annoying Behavior of Both Groups
a.
Russia, France, and other old-fashioned powers would rather see the
world system revert to the old anarchic habits of multipolar competition
b.
Officious moralizing by the idealists
5.
How the Two Parties Combine
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a.

6.

7.
8.
9.

The Party of Hell (forces of darkness) is cynical about the ability of
international institutions to manage conflicts, but believe that establishing
such institutions can weaken and hobble the United States
b.
The Party of Heaven (armies of light) resists American attempts to
preserve its freedom of action
c.
The United States gets caught in a damaging crossfire between them
d.
Negative Coalition: Their diametrically opposed visions of the world [cf.
Thomas Sowell’s A Conflict of Visions] could never permit them to
develop together a constructive alternative to the American project
Neither Group Has a Logical Position
a.
The Party of Heaven’s position means putting the Party of Hell in charge
(1)
The UN Security Council gives the Party of Hell an advantage
(“a permanent veto of expediency over principle”)
b.
If the Party of Hell insists on the game of dirty power politics rather than
high-minded international law, then the United States has the right to
play, too
Basic American Position
America Must Pay a Price Whatever It Chooses to Do
These Problems Tend to Surface at Moments of Crisis

Study Questions
1.

What is the inherent tension (some would say contradiction) in liberal capitalism and
America’s commitment to it? What are some of the perils of progress and the increasing
efficiency of capital markets? What unpleasant reality has led the United States to see
an end to the age-old contest of nations for dominion and conquest? (59-63)

2.

How does the need for international institutions the tension between the imperial and
cooperative aspects of America’s role? What does the author mean by his distinction
between the Party of Heaven and the Party of Hell? What makes them so annoying and
self-contradictory? Why would a coalition between them never accomplish anything
positive? What is the basic American position? (63-69)

Review
America as a change agent
two strategies
Pluses and minuses of international institutions
Party of Hell
negative coalition
basic American position

America as a liberal hegemon
Party of Heaven
UN Security Council

CHAPTER FIVE: THE DECLINE OF FORDISM AND THE
CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN POWER
Outline
A.

STAGES OF CAPITALISM (70-79)
1.
Feudalism
2.
Industrial Revolution
3.
Fordist Era
4.
Difference Between Fordism and Millennial Capitalism
a.
Two Views
b.
Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher
(1)
Contributing Factors: computer technology, international trade
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c.

B.

Obstacles to Progress: labor unions, state ownership, state-guided
investment strategies
5.
Globalization of Production
a.
Destruction of the Fordist Economy [Joseph Schumpeter referred to
capitalism as “creative destruction]
6.
New Burst of Growth
7.
Features of the New Capitalism
a.
Why the Author Calls It “Millennial Capitalism”
b.
It Is Not a Return to Laissez-Faire Capitalism
c.
It Is Not Simply a Matter of Deregulation
8.
Role of Regulation
a.
Protection of Consumers by Promoting More Competition
(1)
Abuses
b.
New Forms of International Regulation
9.
Demographic Shift
a.
Medical and Pension Insurance Programs: Increasingly Less Viable
b.
Investment Decisions Need to Move from State Allocation and Subsidy
Programs to Market-Driven, Yield-Sensitive Investments
10.
Millennial Capitalism Is a Natural Outgrowth of Fordism Itself
a.
Fordist Society Is a Consumer Society
b.
Consumer’s Psychology Increasingly Bears on Social Institutions,
(1)
Baby Boom: regimentation, discipline and passivity disappear
(2)
Daniel Bell: cultural contradictions
11.
Globalization Distinguished from Millennial Capitalism
12.
Unpopularity of the Shift from Fordism
a.
Governments and Elites: Asia, Western Europe, Latin America, Africa
b.
Resentment of and Resistance against “Neoliberal Globalization”
c.
Marginalization of These Elites
d.
Beneficiaries of the Fordist System
(1)
Anti-American Scapegoating
13.
Developing World
a.
“Neoliberals” and “Washington Consensus” Bureaucrats Get the Blame
14.
The Real Culprit: Fordism Is No Longer the Most Efficient Method to Organize
Capitalist Production
a.
Subsidies Created a Web of Costs, Corruption, Vested Interests, and
Irrational Allocation of Resources That Can No Longer Be Tolerated
b.
Capital Seeks the Places in Which It Can Earn the Best Returns
ARAB FORDISM AS A CASE STUDY: XENOPHOBIC HATRED OF “MADE IN
AMERICA” GLOBALIZATION (79-82)
1.
Middle East
a.
Failed Fordism
(1)
Pseudo-Middle Class: dependent on government jobs or
patronage [to a large extent this is true in America’s urban areas,
where middle class housing is shrinking]
b,
In Its Heyday It Managed the Transition from Colonialism to
Independence
2.
Costs of Fordist Subsidies: Hidden and Direct [cf. Bastiat’s The Law]
a.
Vested Interests Fight to Preserve Privileges
b.
Costs Are Hard to Measure But Visible in the Decay of Quality [e.g.,
Yugos]
c.
Political Machines Protect Themselves through Control over Credit
Allocation and Economic Activity
3.
Population Explosion in the Arab World has Worsened These Problems
a.
Stagnant Businesses and Bureaucracies Can Only Absorb a Fraction
of Young Graduates
(1)
By Contrast: Full Employment in the West
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b.

4.
5.

Rise of an Educated Proletariat
(1)
Marginalization of Professionals [they are creatures of a Fordist
welfare state, part of Ortega’s “mass man” phenomenon]
c.
Alternative Islamist Establishment
Boiling Cauldron
a.
American Demand for Open Economies [and transparency]
Cultural Clashes of Fordist Society Intensified
a.
Difficulty of Defending Traditional Values
(1)
Increased Access to Foreign Media
b.
The American Presence Is Made All But Unendurable to Conservatives

Study Questions
1.

How does millennial capitalism differ from Fordism? What aspects of Fordism have
become obstacles to progress? How has regulation been changing? Why does the
author call millennial capitalism a natural outgrowth of Fordism? How does the consumer
psychology (a product of Fordism) create what Daniel Bell calls cultural contradictions?
Why is the shift from Fordism so unpopular in much of the world? Why is Fordism being
undercut and replaced? (70-79)

2.

What does the Arab Fordism of the Middle East exemplify the serious defects of the
Fordist model? In what way was it once more successful? What are some of the costs
of Fordist subsidies? Thought Question: How does the population explosion play into
the hands of the alternative Islamist establishment? How are the cultural clashes of
Fordist society being intensified? [A look at such books as David Kupelian’s The
Marketing of Evil and E. Michael Jones’s Degenerate Moderns show how deep-seated
these clashes are] (79-82)

Review
millennial capitalism
pseudo-middle class
traditional values

cultural contradictions
costs of Fordist subsidies

marginalization of elites
demand for open economies

CHAPTER SIX: BUSH, THE NEOCONS, AND THE
AMERICAN REVIVAL
The four schools of foreign policy described in this chapter (although Jeffersonian isolationism is
only briefly mentioned) coincide, in many ways, with the four British folkways described by David
Hackett Fischer in Albion’s Seed. Mead’s Jacksonian populist nationalists closely resemble
Fischer’s English-Scottish Borderlands/Appalachian Backcountry folkway. Mead’s Wilsonian
idealistic internationalists are the liberal and secularized descendants of Fischer’s East
Anglia/Massachusetts Bay folkway that is represented by the Puritans, even though Wilson’s
ancestors hailed from the Borderlands. The idealistic internationalists are also representative of
the moralistic subculture (associated with New England), as described by Daniel Elazar in
American Federalism. The Hamiltonians are certainly one variety of Elazar’s individualistic
subculture, which he associated with the middle colonies. The individualistic subculture’s
counterpart in Fischer’s scheme is the North Midlands/Delaware Valley folkway that is
represented by the Quakers. But according to Fischer, Alexander Hamilton himself was “a native
West Indian, naturalized New Yorker and extreme nationalist who had no roots in any regional
culture.” Thomas Jefferson, on the other hand, was “descended from Virginia’s ‘distressed
cavaliers’” who left the South of England to settle in Virginia and the Carolinas. The Southern
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regional identity of the Jeffersonians makes them less susceptible to launching or joining
moralistic crusades overseas.
Outline
A.

B.

C.

INCREASING DOMINANCE OF MILLENNIAL CAPITALISM (83-85)
1.
Social Attitudes and Values
a.
Revival of Traditional Individualism
b.
Conservatives vs. Liberals
2.
New Movement
a.
Not a Throwback to Anti-Capitalist Agrarianism
3.
American Revivalists: Supporters of Millennial Capitalism
a.
Assertive, Self-Confident Ideology
4.
New Debate
a.
Revivalists Seek to Claim Terrain over Which Both Parties Contend
b.
Old Foreign Policy Debates: Four Schools:
(1)
economic nationalists [Hamiltonians],
(2)
idealistic internationalists [Wilsonians],
(3)
isolationists [Jeffersonians], and
(4)
populist nationalists [Jacksonians]
c.
The American Revival Has Its Roots in the Hamiltonian Party
(1)
Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressives
(2)
Structural Changes in the Economy Are Driving and Shaping
the New Ideologies
REVIVAL HAMILTONIANS (85-88)
1.
Institutionalization of American Business
a.
Rent-Seeking: Rents of Large Oligopolies and Monopolies Were
Shared Among the Key Stakeholders in the Stable Regulatory Climate of
the New Deal
b.
Old Rockefeller Republican/Moderate Democrat Establishment,
1940-1975 [The “Yankees” of Carl Oglesby’s The Yankee and Cowboy
Wars]
2.
Renewed Dynamism: Wall Street’s Embrace of Unfettered Competition
a.
Flexibility more important than macroeconomic stability
b.
EU no longer seen as the automatic prime trading partner
3.
Hi-Tech Military-Industrial Complex [Oglesby’s “Cowboys” associated with the
aerospace and petroleum industries of the Southwest with the addition of
the more recent electronics revolution]
4.
Confidence
a.
Cold War era
b.
Tables Turned: American economy has again outdistanced its rivals
(1)
Structural weaknesses of the European economies; institutional
weaknesses and political problems of the others
REVIVAL WILSONIANS (88-96)
1.
American Wilsonian Tradition of Progressive Internationalism
a.
Decline of the mainline Protestant denominations that shaped it
b.
Crisis and change in the Catholic Church, another source of support for
institutionalized multilateralism
c.
Revival Wilsonians are a coalition of conservative Christian and Jewish
supporters of Israel
(1)
They have changed the traditional Republican approach to the
Israeli/Palestinian question
(2)
They are developing a new version of the Wilsonian agenda
2.
Three Traditional Wilsonian Ideas
a.
Linkage between American security and the pursuit of American values
b.
Rule-based global institutions should play a growing and ultimately
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decisive role in international life
Questions of value should be addressed primarily in secular terms
rather than using Protestant Christian terms
(1)
Reason: Protestants lost their theological zeal and nonProtestants hopped aboard the Wilsonian bandwagon
3.
Neoconservative Policy Intellectuals
a.
Idealism/security linkage on steroids
(1)
Revival Wilsonians are confident in American values
4.
International Institutions
a.
Wilsonians have traditionally belonged to the Party of Heaven
5.
Passionate Dissent of Revival Wilsonians to the Old Wilsonian Orthodoxy
a.
“Sectarian” Protestant Tradition: Built on suspicion of universal
institutions like the Catholic Church, and the rejection of the ideal of a
single world state
b.
Modern European Jewry: “World community” stood aside as millions of
Jews perished in the Holocaust
6.
Common Ground of Christian and Jewish Revival Wilsonians
a.
The United States must enforce universal principles and values in the
teeth of bitter opposition
7.
Realist Means in Pursuit of Idealist Ends
a.
Strange Bedfellows of Neoconservative Thought: Alliance of
realpolitik with a values-based foreign policy is widely seen as an
unlikely and unsustainable combination
8.
Activist, Interventionist U.S. Policy
a.
In the old Wilsonianism, the interventionist impulse was checked by
Wilsonian ideas about international law
b.
Revival Wilsonianism is less inhibited; “it can only be dissuaded from
activist foreign policy on pragmatic grounds
9.
Rise of a Wilsonian Realpolitik
a.
Promotion of more specifically Christian rather than liberal secular
humanist values in foreign policy
b.
19C missionary roots
c.
Cultural hegemony of liberal Fordist ecumenism is being challenged by
a millennial, conservative ecumenism
10
Power of This Ideology Is Easily “Misunderestimated”
11
Evangelical/Orthodox Jew Alliance
a.
Premillennial Dispensationalism
12.
Deinstitutionalization of the Wilsonian Project
a.
Wilsonian human rights and democratic values are more popular than
Wilsonian institutions
b.
Run-up to the Iraq War shows the weakness of American support for
international institutions
c.
Unilateralism
13.
Shallowness of Principled Multiculturalism
[Some in evangelical circles similarly refer to “principled pluralism”]
a.
e.g., moralistic rhetoric of the Diocese of New Hampshire
14.
Neoconservative Movement: Cutting Edge of Revival Wilsonianism
15.
The Rise of Conservative Religious Movements Has Laid the Foundation for a
New Kind of Religious Establishment
a.
From outside to inside the policy process
b.
What the final form may look like
c.
Limits of what the public will accept
d.
Temptations of Wilsonian overstretch
JACKSONIAN AMERICA (96-103)
1.
Decline in Support for Fordism
a.
Profound changes
c.

D.
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(1)
(2)

E.

decline of social democratic values
increasing attraction of classical Anglo-American individualism
among later immigrant groups
(3)
revival of anti-big government populism and defiant individualism
2.
Achilles Heel of Fordist Society
a.
Its collective, institutional nature
b.
Lack of success in building parties on the basis of economic rather than
social and cultural factors
3.
Fundamental Incompatibility of Vision
a.
Fordist Society: Classes, masses, and blocs mediated by bureaucrats
b.
Jacksonian America hates that kind of society
4.
Balance of Cultural and Economic Forces: Tilting Away from Fordism
5.
Anti-Fordist Dynamic
a.
New Deal Democratic coalition: ethnic ties are dissolving due to Fordist
housing policy that has moved people from ethnic neighborhoods
b.
Workers now commute great distances
c.
Class identity withers away
d.
What lingers: race, gender, and Southern regional identity
6.
Forest Fire Analogy
a.
Reversion to hardwoods after a transitional period of conifer hegemony
b.
Popular rebellion against the “system” of the Fordist mandarinate
7.
The Enemy: An Arrogant Clerisy of Administrative and Cultural Elites [cf. liberal
Fordist ecumenism and principled multiculturalism, Julien Benda’s Treason of the
Clerisy, and Roger Scruton’s Culture of Repudiation]
a.
Millennial capitalism has less need of this intermediary class [part of
Marx’s petite bourgeoisie]
b.
Trend toward Disintermediation: information technology and the
Internet are reducing the need for middlemen
8.
Consequences of These Trends
a.
Breakup of Learned Guilds
(1)
Demise of trade monopolies
(2)
Pressure on the tenure system
(3)
Experts are losing their immunity and their authority
b.
Political Result: A “both ends against the middle” coalition
(1)
This is a modern variation on the original Jacksonian coalition
c.
Shrinking of Middle Management
(1)
Proletarianization of the Professions [Milton Friedman notes
that “the physician [today] is an employee of an insurance
company or an employee of the government. . . The end result is
third party payment and, worst of all, third party treatment.”
Imprimis, July 2006]
d.
Clear choices between political parties will be rare [both parties try to
recruit the disaggregated, uncommitted middle ground of the electorate]
(1)
The old economy shrinks as manufacturing employment declines
GATHERING STRENGTH OF THE AMERICAN REVIVAL MODEL AND THE
MILLENNIAL ECONOMIC MODEL (103-05)
1.
They Have Been the Dominant Forces in Domestic Politics Since1980
2.
Turnabouts in Foreign Policy
a.
Reagan’s anti-establishment, American Revival foreign policy was
abandoned by Bush 41
b.
Clinton moved away from Fordism in international economic policy but
remained Fordist in politics and security policy
c.
Bush 43 has been placing American foreign policy squarely on the basis
of American Revival ideas

Study Questions
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1.

Identify the four old schools of the foreign policy debates. In which of these schools does
the “American Revival” have its roots? What has been the ideological effect of structural
changes in the economy? (83-85)

2.

Who are the Revival Hamiltonians? How do they differ from the earlier, Fordist
Hamiltonians or their 19C predecessors? Thought Question: What is it about their
economic base that gives them powerful leverage? What gives them confidence? (8588)

3.

Who are the Revival Wilsonians? What were the components of the earlier Wilsonian
coalition and what were their key ideas? What accounts for the passionate dissent by the
Revival Wilsonians against the old Wilsonian orthodoxy? Thought Question: Why is their
role such a pivotal one (even though the Hamiltonians hold more of the economic
power)? What are some of the “strange fellows” that energize neoconservatism and
Revival Wilsonianism? How is the hegemony of liberal Fordist ecumenism being
challenged? Why is the old Wilsonian project, along with its “principled multiculturalism,”
being deinstitutionalized (largely bypassing international organizations)? What new kind
of religious establishment is emerging? (88-96)

4.

What is it in the nature of Fordist society that Jacksonians find so objectionable? What
factors contribute to the anti-Fordist dynamic? Who do Jacksonians regard as the
enemy? What accounts for the increase of “disintermediation”? What are the
consequences of the resulting disaggregation [e.g., the break-up of traditional voting
blocs] and decentralization? (96-103)

5.

Discuss the fortunes of American Revivalism and the millennial economy in domestic as
well as foreign policy since 1980. (103-05)

Review
American Revivalists
effects of structural changes
traditional Wilsonian ideas
liberal Fordist ecumenism
new religious establishment
disintermediation
turnabouts in foreign policy

old schools of American foreign policy
Revival Hamiltonians
Revival Wilsonians
neoconservatives
Wilsonian realpolitik
deinstitutionalization
principled multiculturalism
Jacksonian hatred of Fordism clerisy
proletarianization of the professions and other consequences

PART THREE: REVIVAL IN ACTION
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION
Outline
A.

INTRODUCTION (109-10)
1.
Cornerstones of the Bush Security Policy
a.
Preventing hostile hegemonic powers establishing themselves
b.
Protecting freedom of the seas and skies
c.
Maintaining American sticky power
d.
Bring pro-American democracy to the Middle East
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B.

C.

D.

2.
Revolutionary Ideology of the American Revival
DESIGNATION OF THE WAR ON TERROR (110-13)
1.
Most Significant Decision: Invasion of Iraq
2.
Bitterly Controversial Choices
3.
Concern with “Grand Terror”
4.
Allies Preferred a More Nuanced View
5.
Power of the Jacksonians
6.
Metaphorical Wars
a.
Cold War
b.
Merits of the Latest Metaphor
(1)
Al-Qaeda poses a direct threat to the American economic
strategy
(2)
Exacerbation of a damaging recession (2000-2003)
(3)
A fundamentalist caliphate would threaten the American
presence in the Middle East
(4)
Large scale of the violence and total nature of terrorist demands
resembles the actions of a hostile great power
7.
War on Terror Replaces the Cold War as the Central Organizing Idea
a.
Ballooning defense spending, return to the Reagan fiscal straitjacket
on Fordist social programs
b.
Support of hard-core conservatives
c.
Democrats’ dilemma
8.
Jacksonian Response
a.
Vigorous foreign policy
b.
Clinton years
9.
Restructuring of American Foreign Policy
10.
Interpretation of 9/11
DIFFERENCES WITH PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS HIGHLIGHTED (114-15)
1.
“Axis of Evil”
2.
Potential Targets for “Preemptive War”
3.
Dramatic Language
4.
International Tensions Systematically Intensified
IRAQ WAR (115-20)
1.
Rationale
a.
Presumption: Development of WMDs
2.
Other Considerations
3.
Three Separate Lines of Argument in Favor of the War
4.
Jacksonian: Clear and Present Danger Test
a.
Need for a powerful statement to America’s enemies
(1)
Warning shot
5.
Revival Wilsonian Neoconservatism: Making the World Safe for Democracy
a.
Reconstruction of the Middle East region
(1)
Sobering effect on neighboring regimes
(2)
Humanitarian dimension
6.
Hamiltonian Realism: Ending an increasingly expensive strategy of containment
a.
Containment strategy poisoned the region
b.
Saudi Arabia was the chief problem
(1)
Regime delegitimized by the presence of foreign troops and thus
put on the defensive
(2)
American pressure recognized as likely to be counterproductive
c.
Other Problems with Containment
(1)
Erosion of sanctions
(2)
Civilian suffering
(3)
Taking Iraqi oil off the world market aided OPEC price hawks
(4)
Saddam left free to engage in mischief
d.
Bottom Line: containment was a political and humanitarian disaster
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e.

E.

Strategic Rationale: “Taking Iraq’s political weight out of the radical
Sunni Arab camp would make a permanent and probably beneficial
change in the political geometry of the Middle East”
7.
Summary
a.
The case for war was rich but the administration’s public case for the war
was surprisingly thin
CIAO EUROPA (120-25)
1.
Willingness to Part Company with France and Germany
a.
Europe fell to third place in American concerns
2.
Place of Europe in Traditional American Grand Strategy
a.
Dominant position: 1917-1991
b.
Limited European cooperation today
3.
Europe Is Unlikely to Provide Help
4.
Limits of the Franco-German Alliance
a.
Germans want an end to power politics
b.
The French elite wants to get back in the game
c.
Common opposition to American foreign policy
d.
The U.S. has extended the Monroe Doctrine to Europe
(1)
The French and the Germans will not be permitted to silence
Poland and other dissenting countries
5.
Middle East as the American Priority
6.
Trampling on European Sensibilities
7.
Different Perceptions of Europe’s Place
a.
Europe’s Self-Image as an Economic Superpower
(1)
End of the Soviet threat has emboldened Europe’s selfconfidence
b.
Demand for a European Veto
c.
Issue of International Rule of Law
8.
Al-Qaeda as a Common Threat
9.
Iraq and Iran
a.
Nuclear proliferation issue
b.
Ideal outcome of the war from the European standpoint
10.
Implications for U.S.-European Relations
a.
They do not have a joint Middle East policy
b.
U.S. policy likely will shift to ensuring the continuing independence of EU
member states

Study Questions
1.

What are the cornerstones of the Bush foreign policy? Do they differ significantly from
the traditional cornerstones? Why is it difficult to grasp the idea of a War on Terror?
What are some of the drawbacks as well as some of the merits of the War on Terror
metaphor? How has it reshaped American foreign and domestic policy? How has the
Bush Administration differed from its predecessors? (109-115)

2.

What was the rationale given for the Iraq War? What three groups argued in its favor?
What reasons did they give? What made Saudi Arabia the chief problem? What were
some of the problems with the containment strategy that led Hamiltonians to reject it?
What was the strategic rationale for war? (115-20)

3.

Why is the United States largely saying goodbye to its former Cold War European allies?
Why was Europe once America’s chief strategic partner but also its greatest problem?
What considerations weaken the Franco-German alliance? What differences have
created greater disagreements and even bred animosity? Thought Question: How do the
Europeans and Americans differ on the Middle East? (120-25)
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Review
cornerstones of security policy metaphorical wars
War on Terror
Jacksonian, Revival Wilsonian, and Hamiltonian arguments in favor of the Iraq War
Saudi Arabia
problems with containment
strategic rationale
extension of the Monroe Doctrine

CHAPTER EIGHT: WHERE BUSH IS RIGHT
Outline
A.

B.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (126-30)
1.
Basic Strategic Direction
a.
Era of harmonic convergence with Europe is over
b.
Ideas and values of the American Revival
c.
Continuing deconstruction of the New Deal
2.
Foreign Policy Must Be More Jacksonian Now
a.
Attitude of Liberal Internationalists
(1)
They “see the Jacksonian tendencies of the American public as
regrettable remnants of a barbarous past”
b.
Public Feels Threatened
c.
Rising Expense of American Foreign Policy
3.
Anticipated Response to More Serious Attacks
a.
“It is difficult to overestimate the power and the passion that would go
into the public response to successful attacks on American cities with
weapons of mass destruction” [the ferocity of the Israeli response to the
kidnapping of its soldiers in the summer of 2006 and the Carthaginians’
reaction to their doom in the 2C BC are indicative]
b.
“Americans will respond to provocations like those of September 11 with
massive and overwhelming force. Those who cannot stand us must
learn at least to fear us.”
c.
Bush Administration’s Response to 9/11
4.
America Still Demonstrates the Capacity for Sophisticated Interventions
a.
Prerequisite: Jacksonians must be able to trust their “leaders with
complex, nuanced responses to urgent policy challenges”
b.
The response to 9/11 as an act of war was the only politically viable
choice
5.
Regime Change in Iraq: A Significant Accomplishment
6.
Middle East Policy: Concrete Results Began Appearing by 2004
a.
Capture of Saddam Hussein
b.
Libya began dismantling its WMD program
c.
Iranian arms inspections
d.
Syria
e.
Saudi Arabia
f.
Hamas
7.
Strategic Opportunities
SHIFT FROM EUROCENTRIC POLICY (130-32)
1.
Reason: Rapid Development of the Non-Western World
2.
Europe Cannot Be Granted a Veto
3.
Turning Away from Europe May Be the Best Way to Build a Better Relationship
4.
Need to Dispel European Illusions
a.
Rejection of the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court
5.
Clinton’s Consultation and Deference Only Encouraged These Illusions
6.
Bush Administration Made the Strategic Decision to Discourage Illusions
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a.
Europe’s inflated sense of its importance
Best Basis for Progress toward European Integration: a Good German
Relationship with the United States
SHIFT AWAY FROM INSTITUTIONS TOWARD COALITIONS OF THE WILLING (13234)
1.
Dysfunctionality of International Institutions
a.
General Assembly
b.
Security Council
c.
World Trade Organization (WTO)
2.
Sluggishness of International Institutions
3.
Inability to Provide the Needed Rapid Response
a.
Much work will have to take place outside such institutions
4.
Kosovo as an Illustration
OTHER BUSH ADMINISTRATION SUCCESSES (134-35)
1.
China and the Two Koreas
2.
China and Japan
a.
Taiwan
b.
Normalization of Relations with China
3.
India and Pakistan
BIG DECISIONS (135-37)
1.
Problem: The Administration’s Conduct Has Been Choppy and Uncertain
2.
Raw Quality of Post-9/11 Strategic Thinking
3.
New and Original Directions in Foreign Policy Often Start Badly
a.
Theodore Roosevelt
(1)
The Philippines
b.
Woodrow Wilson
(1)
The Fourteen Points and the League of Nations
c.
Froth and spray of new waves
7.

C.

D.

E.

Study Questions
1.

How would you characterize the new strategic direction of American foreign policy? Why
must it be more Jacksonian now? What is the attitude of liberal internationalists?
Politically, what is required for the U.S. government to be able to make sophisticated
interventions, as in the case of negotiated with China or responding to humanitarian
disasters? What are some of the positive developments in the Middle East that followed
regime change in Iraq? (126-30)

2.

Why was it necessary for the United States to shift from a Eurocentric policy? What
European illusions needed to be dispelled? Thought Question: Why is a good
relationship between Germany and the United States the best basis for progress toward
European integration? (130-32)

3.

Why is the United States shifting away from international institutions to coalitions of the
willing? What makes them so dysfunctional? What are some of the Bush Administration
successes? What problems have undercut these successes? What often happens to
bold new foreign policy initiatives? What were some of the mistakes of the Theodore
Roosevelt and Wilson administrations? (132-27)

Review
basic strategic direction
Jacksonianism and the attitude of liberal internationalists
sophisticated interventions
Bush Middle East policy : concrete results
development of the non-western world
European illusions
dysfunctionality of international institutions
China and Japan
Theodore Roosevelt
Woodrow Wilson
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CHAPTER NINE: WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO TREAD
Outline
A.

B.

MISTAKES AND FAILURES (138-41)
1.
Tactical Mistakes
2.
Intelligence and Assessment Errors
a.
Iraqi WMD programs
b.
Turkish failures
c.
Delay in Security Council resolution
3.
War Policy
a.
Failure to take elementary precautions against possible setbacks
4.
Aftermath of the War: Gravest Challenge to the Bush Presidency
5.
Avoidable Mistakes
a.
Churchill’s method of securing public opinion
b.
Failure to better plan for postwar Iraq [Iraqi executive officer to American
liaison officer Joe W. Guthrie: “You broke our country. Now, you fix it.”]
6.
Learning the Value of Gravitas
a.
Avoiding triumphalism
DAMAGED RELATIONS WITH KEY AMERICAN ALLIES AND PARTNERS (141-51)
1.
Misunderstanding Europe’s Political Situation
a.
The Administration allowed France to get between Washington and
Moscow
2.
France Underrated
a.
Intelligence and flair of the French at their best
b.
The French feel free to engage in global diplomacy
(1)
French calculations changed due to Gerhard Schröder’s
reelection campaign
(2)
Opportunity for the French to oppose American goals
(3)
Expectation of the United States
d.
Worst French Blunder
(1)
Jacques Chirac blocks the second Security Council resolution
(2)
Revenge is a dish best served cold
e.
Little Can Be Done to Repair the Damage
3.
Germany
a.
Collateral damage to American-German relationship maximized
b.
Shock to European neighbors over the Franco-German arrogance and
unilateralism over the euro
4.
America’s Divide and Rule Policy Was Still Not a Success
a.
Reversal of sixty years of American policy to unite Europe
5.
Europe’s Decline: A Problem for American Foreign Policy
a.
The United States can count on less help; that increases the costs and
risks of America’s world role
b.
More political headaches
(10
America as a scapegoat
(2)
Bad European decisions
(3)
Europe’s best choice
6.
Latin America
a.
Vicente Fox
b.
Hugo Chavez
c.
FTAA negotiations scaled back
7.
Setbacks and Defeats in Public Diplomacy
a.
Unpopularity of the United States
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b.
Nuances
Reasons for the Failure
a.
Spending on public diplomacy slashed
(1)
USIA moved to the State Department
(2)
These programs were products of a Cold War campaign to win
support
b.
Harsh rhetoric
c.
Chief failures were at the level of elite communication
(1)
Cold War experience with political elites of American allies
9.
Secession of Elites
a.
Exceptions
(1)
Tony Blair won public tolerance in support of the United States
at great political cost [See TRB in New Republic, July 3, 2006]
b.
Reasons for the secession vary from place to place
10.
Failure to Prepare for This Secession
ROOT CAUSES OF FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS (151-53)
1.
Difficulties of Holding Together a Vibrant But Combustible Coalition
a.
Factions’ mutual suspicion and hostility
2.
Cost of the Failures
a.
Loss of good will in the Arab world
3.
Irony of the Neoconservative Failure
a.
Intervention justified on humanitarian grounds
b.
Failures of the occupation
4.
The Failures Are Not Decisive
CLASSIC PROBLEM OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (153-55)
1.
Long, Complex Wars Cannot Be Fought Without Jacksonian Support
2.
Jacksonian Resistance to Nation-Building
a.
Loss of enthusiasm after Saddam Hussein was overthrown
3.
Neoconservatives See the Work of Reconstruction and Occupation a Model
for the Middle East
a.
Jacksonians “reach for their guns” at the mention of nation-building
4.
The Perennial Dilemma
a.
Wilsonians often write checks Jacksonians do not want to cash
5.
Neoconservatives Got a Chance to Think Tank Ideas in the Field
AMERICAN REVIVAL (151-60)
1.
The Conventional Wisdom
2.
Current Problems Reflect the Failures and Successes of the Clinton
Administration
a.
Central Europe
b.
China
3.
Bush’s Most Acute Problems Due to Clinton Failures
a.
North Korea
b.
Asian financial crisis
c.
Indonesia
d.
Middle East
4.
Shared Assumptions
a.
American seen as the irresistible nation
b.
Avoidable public rebuffs
5.
Need to Develop New American Revival Approaches to Problems Inherent in the
American Project
6.
Consequences of the Rise of Neoconservatism
a.
Unsettling push for democratization
b.
Scorn for the old Wilsonian institutions has led to isolation
7.
American Revival: More Strength and More Stress
a.
Inner logic of capitalism
b.
Increase of its revolutionary tension
8.

C.

D.

E.
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8.

F.

G.

Capitalist Development Cannot Be Slowed
a.
Resistance, resentment, and volatility
b.
Legitimacy crisis for the American system
9.
Revolution in the American System
a.
“Change always poses problems for hegemonic powers”
BASIC CONTRADICTION IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM (160-61)
1.
Is It a Level Playing Field or an American Empire?
a.
It is an uneasy combination of the two
2.
The Bush Administration Lost Control of This Balance After 9/11
3.
It Also Lost Control over Management of the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict
DIFFICULTIES OF RUNNING AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (161-62)
1.
How Leaders Have Dealt with Unprecedented Challenges
a.
Lincoln, 1864
b.
First Phase of World War Two
2.
Bush’s Domestic Opponents
3.
Difficult International Environment
a.
Bush successes
b.
Failures

Study Questions
1.

How does the author distinguish between various types of mistakes? What have been
some of the costs? What was the nature of the costliest one? Why does it still represent
the gravest challenge to the Bush presidency? Which mistakes were the most
avoidable? Why? Gravitas is a Latin term for something of substance, heavy or weighty
[such as C.S. Lewis’s “The Weight of Glory”] rather than vapid or vacuous. [138-41)

2.

How did the administration misread the political situation in Europe, especially in France?
What were some of the French and German blunders? What price is being paid for these
mistakes and by whom? What is Europe’s best remaining choice? What have been
some of the mistakes and missed opportunities in Latin America? What factors help
account for some of the setbacks and defeats in public diplomacy? Which have been the
most important? What does the author mean by the “secession of elites”? [This seems
to build on the “circulation of elites” concept of Vilfredo Pareto. “Secession” suggests that
Timothy Leary’s “tune in, turn on, and drop out” is becoming a new paradigm for elite selfdestruction]. Who has stood in the gap to defend the United States? (141-51)

3.

Thought Question: Evaluate the nature of the conflicts that have bred to our most
expensive foreign policy failures. [One that the author alludes to under the rubric of
“secession of the elites” is summarized by Philip Rieff, author of Triumph of the
Therapeutic and My Life among the Deathworks: “all communications of ideals come
under permanent and easy suspicion”]. What are some of the costs of these failures?
What is ironic about the neoconservative failure? (151-53)

4.

What is the classic problem of American foreign policy? Why? How is America’s
perennial dilemma illustrated by the conflict of visions between the Jacksonians and the
neoconservative Revival Wilsonians? What is one of the weaknesses of the latter?
(153-55)

5.

Why are the policies pursued by the Bush administration so intimately connected with
those of the Clinton Administration? Where may some of the most acute problems be
found? What shared assumptions by the two administrations have created problems?
How does the revolutionary tension associated with the new capitalism also contribute to
“what is likely to be a serious legitimacy crisis for the [global] American system”? What is
its basic contradiction? Where has control over the balance been lost? (155-62)
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PART FOUR: THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY
CHAPTER TEN: FIGHTING TERROR
Outline
A.

B.

C.

URGENCY OF TODAY”S CHALLENGES (165-67)
1.
Two Challenges in the Late 1940s
a.
Stop spread of Communism
b.
Replace the British world system
c.
The price of failure
2.
Another War on Two Fronts
a.
Fanatical terrorists
b.
Need to repair damage to the American system
c.
The price of failure
3.
Link Between Poverty and Terrorism Is Not a Simple One
a.
Privileged backgrounds of revolutionary leaders
4.
Societies in Crisis Breed Radical Ideologies
a.
19C Industrial Revolution
5.
Crisis of the Capitalist System Weakens the Forces of Order
a.
Weimar Germany
b.
Post-WWII Italy and France
c.
Post-Communist Russia
6.
Failed States
a.
Bottom Line: United States and its allies must find ways to promote
orderly and peaceful development or our security will be endangered by
the ideologies and organizations of terror
FACING UP TO THE THREAT OF GRAND TERROR (167-68)
1.
It Is a War
2.
Nature of the Threat These Groups Pose: Time Will Tell
a.
Their resilience and resourcefulness
b.
Preventive measures needed
c.
Security concerns of the public
d.
Error of “misunderestimating”
NEED TO ARTICULATE OUR GRAND STRATEGY (168-75)
1.
Cold War Containment Policy
a.
George Kennan’s analysis
2.
Other Preferences
a.
“Rollback”
b.
“Live and Let Live”
3.
Policy Debates
4.
Flexibility of Containment
5.
Triple Containment
a.
Military: alliances, nuclear deterrent, credible presence in threatened
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areas
Political expansion opposed
Soviet influence opposed
(1)
Labor organizations
(2)
Anticommunist intellectual and cultural leaders
6.
Need to Update the Containment Concept
a.
War must be fought on several fronts
b.
Containment is already a familiar policy
(1)
Need to stress continuities
7.
Differences of Strategic Approach in the New War
a.
Deterrence: nuclear arsenal does not deter as it once did
(1)
Relative irrelevance of the nuclear arsenal
(2)
Greater freedom for direct attacks against terrorist organizations
8.
Forward Containment
a.
Version of triple containment
(1)
Political and military
(2)
Ideological
(3)
Expansion and consolidation of state power
b.
The Hope: deprive terrorists of real victories, keeping them weak and
divided
9.
Current Focus on the First Kind of Containment
d.
Current proactive efforts
e.
Preventing proliferation
f.
Upgrading home defenses
10.
Cutting Links Between Terrorist Groups and Governments
a.
State-sponsored terrorism during the Cold War
(1)
East Germany and Syria
(2)
Arab-Israeli Conflict
11.
Collapse of the Soviet Union Ended East European Sponsorship of Terrorism
a.
State-sponsorship persists in the Middle East
b.
Acts of war against civilization [cf. Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah]
12.
Disingenuous Subterfuge of Distinguishing Civilian from Military Funding
13.
Need to Create a Strong International Consensus
a.
Example of Libya
14.
United States Will Be Entangled in the Contradictions of the International System
a.
Bottom Line: Unilateral action may be required
b.
Even though the Parties of Heaven and Hell may combine against us [cf.
Dore Gold’s Tower of Babble, Pierre Manent, and Roger Scruton]
THE SECOND DIMENSION: IDEOLOGY (175-82)
1.
The Ideas of Communism Were on March During the Cold War [and are again on
the march in Latin America today]
a.
Today the ideas of the terrorists need to be contained
2.
Need for a Better Name Than “Islamicism” for the Ideology We Are Opposing
a.
One candidate: Arab Fascism
3.
Two Forms of Arab Fascism
a.
Secular: Ba’athism (Arab Renaissance national socialism)
b.
Religious: Osama bin Laden
c.
Totalitarian politics
d.
White [or, better, Green] vs. Black Fascism
4.
We Must Push for Political Containment of White Fascists
a.
Need to distinguish White fascism from conservative Islam
b.
We must acknowledge legitimate opposition to Western cultural
penetration
(1)
We can make common cause with legitimate Muslims
5.
Efforts of NGOs and Private Citizens
a.
Education of women
b.
c.

D.
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E.

b.
Attention must be paid to Islamic ideas and values
c.
Need to study fascist materials
6.
Exaggerated Sense of the Differences That Divide Us
a.
Jacobin Model of Mustapha Kemal Atatürk’s Secular State
(1)
Outward manifestations of religious commitments are frowned on
by aggressively secular states: France, Mexico, and Turkey [cf.
French laicism and Graham Greene’s The Power and the Glory]
b.
Attempt to Confine the Influence of Religion to the Private Sphere
(1)
Civil codes rooted in Roman law are adopted
7.
Populist Reaction Against Aggressive Secularism
a.
The American model is not part of the Muslim historical experience
b.
Potential point of contract: the American idea of a free religion is a free
state
c.
Similarities between religious policies of the early caliphs and the
American people
8.
Attempts to Find Common Ground
a.
American Christianity
(1)
Absorbed elements of the Islamic critique of Byzantine
Christianity
(2)
Christians pioneered the critical scrutiny of texts
(3)
Trinitarian piety of contemporary American Christians is a far cry
from the pagan polytheism that tainted parts of the early Church
(4)
Religious tolerance
9.
Exaggerated Fears of Evangelical Militancy
a.
Flexibility
(1)
Conservative ecumenism
b.
Historical direction of American religion in overcoming bigotry
10
Possible Result: A Richer, More Authentic Dialog of Civilizations
11.
Historical Precedent: Challenge of the Cold War
a.
Racism addressed
b.
Capitalism responded to the Communist challenge
12.
Today’s Moral Challenges
a.
Need to renew our personal faith commitments
ADDRESSING THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT (182-89)
1.
So Much Debate Has Yielded So Little Consensus or Insight
2.
Support for Israel
a.
Regarded by many as excessive and one-sided
b.
failure to pressure Israel on its settlements policy
3.
Europe’s Blind Eye
a.
Europe is a root cause
(1)
Anti-Semitism
(2)
Imperialism
4.
Need for a More Creative Engagement
5.
Europe’s Unearned Air of Moral Superiority
6.
No Acceptable Peace Settlement Is Imminent
7.
Attitudes of the Israeli Public
8.
The Palestinian Equation Is Even More Complex
a.
Dispossessed refugees
9.
Argument of Israeli Hawks
10.
The Dilemma
a.
There is little that an outside power can do to force a solution
(1)
Risks to peacekeeping forces
(2)
Similar position of the British in the 1940s
b.
Breakdown of the Oslo peace process
11.
Need to Focus on the Future of the Palestinian People
a.
Question of the future of aid to refugees
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b.
Need to shift focus from territorial compromise to the future of the people
Proposals for Just Compensation
a.
Compensation to Holocaust survivors was $50-100 billion
b.
The United States should take the lead in proposing an international
commission
c.
Emphasis should be on individual compensation claims
(1)
Proof of wrongdoing would not be required
d.
Substantial contribution from the United States
e.
Help from Europe and Japan
f.
Need to help individuals and families to leave the blighted camp system
13.
There Is No Prospect of Ending the Dispute Soon
14.
But the United States Needs to Make a Serious Effort
THE THIRD ELEMENT: BLOCKING STATE TERRORISM (189-90)
1.
The Establishment of Fascist Governments Must Be Resisted
2.
The Case of Hitler
3.
Governments Cannot Be Permitted to Have Links to Terrorist Movements
12.

F.

Study Questions
1.

Compare today’s challenges with those of the late 1940s. In each case, what is (or was)
the price of failure? Explore the link between poverty and terrorism. Thought Question:
How does the background of revolutionary elites illustrate the “secession of elites”?
[Roger Scruton’s culture of repudiation” and Kenneth Minogue’s “political moralism” both
contribute to an understanding of this phenomenon]. What factors have bred radical
ideologies? What must the United States and its allies do in response – or face failure?
(165-67)

2.

What is the nature of the grand terror we face? What assumptions must we make? The
Cold War containment strategy was only one of several. Summarize the analysis of
George F. Kennan. What were some other strategies? What options were discussed in
the policy debates of the Cold War? What does Mead mean by triple containment? How
does he propose updating the concept for the War on Terror? What are the advantages
of a containment strategy? What are some of the new realities? (167-72)

3.

What does Mead mean by “forward containment”? What are its components? Where is
the current emphasis? What was the West’s weakness in dealing with terrorist groups
during the Cold war? In the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, what is needed? What
constraints will limit American options? (172-75)

4.

How important is the ideological dimension of the struggle? What are the two forms of
Arab Fascism? [Problem of terminology: the radical Shiism of Hezbollah developed in
Persian Iran]. What understanding is needed in order to exercise discernment? What
necessary role is played by NGOs and private citizens? What must they do? What is the
western intellectual source of the modern secular state? The populist reaction against
secularism in the Muslim world exaggerates the philosophical and political differences
that divide Muslims and Americans, who have also resisted the extremes of secularism.
Thought Question: Why is the American model of “a free church in a free state” so
difficult for the Muslim world to grasp? Where may common ground be found? There is
also a similarly exaggerated fear of evangelical militancy (“fundamentalism”) by secular
liberals. How may such scorn be rebutted historically? How may fanatical fascists be
isolated in the Middle East? What were some of the positive American responses to the
moral challenge of the Cold War? What is needed today? (175-82)

5.

Why is Europe a root cause of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and why does it remain so?
Why is the Palestinian equation even more complex than the Israeli? What is the
dilemma? Why does Mead believe the focus must shift from a territorial compromise to
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preparing “a significantly better future for the Palestinian people”? What precedent is
there for Mead’s recommended approach? Who could help? (182-89)
6.

What does history suggest needs to be done about state terrorism? (189-90)
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: RECONSTRUCTING THE
AMERICAN PROJECT
A.

B.

NEED FOR NEW ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS (191-93)
1.
Search for an Ideal to Replace the “Harmonic Convergence” of the Fordist Era
2.
Checklist of Interests That Defined the 20C American Project
a.
Europe
b.
Asia
c.
Grand Terror and Arabian Fascism
3.
Strength of American Hard Power
a.
Weakness: intelligence deficiencies
DIFFICULTIES WITH AMERICAN SOFT POWER (193-98)
1.
Paradox
a.
Earlier worries about challenges from Europe and Japan before the shift
(1)
Our greater ease with the new system’s individualism and
inequality made it easier to accept the pain of the transition and
reap the rewards
b.
But it increasingly appears that this socio-economic transformation has
undermined or poses new challenges for America’s soft power
c.
Alienation of elite and mass constituencies around the world
2.
American Unpopularity
a.
Its genesis in the 1990s
(1)
Asian financial crisis
(2)
Latin American economic reforms
(3)
NAFTA
b.
Wellsping of anti-Americanism was tapped by Gerhard Schröder to win
re-election in 2002
3.
Reversing Course Is Not the Answer
4.
Effect of an Awakened Jacksonian Public Opinion
a.
Multilateral engagement with the world on something like Europe’s
terms is not an option
5.
No Turning Back the Clock on Economic Policy
a.
Fordist nostalgia
b.
The new methods promise greatly enhanced living standards
c.
The quest for greater efficiency and dynamism is essential
6.
New American Task: Build a New Version of the Old American System
a.
Potential for millennial capitalism
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7.

C.

Decentralization
a.
Reduction of elite influence
b.
Harder for authorities to govern
(1)
Germany’s quarrel with Washington
(2)
Growing populist political atmosphere
8.
Angels Being Thrown Out of Their Whirlwinds: A Billion Mutinies
9.
Need to Repackage Our Leadership [and make it more unobtrusive]
a.
World is looking for a new approach
NEED FOR A NEW AND MORE CREATIVE APPROACH TO GLOBAL GOVERANCE
(198-203)
1.
Sterile Debate over Institutions
a.
The American political process refuses to embrace trade-offs
2.
There Is No Perfect Solution to the Tensions and Contradictions
3.
Key International Institutions Were Designed for a Different World
a.
Imperial rule still prevailed at the time
b.
There was a greater diversity of development
4.
The Problem Is One of Representation: The Paradox
a.
Only truly global institutions represent everybody
b.
If everybody is equally and fairly represented, nobody has any real
power [a corollary to this phenomenon was noticed by Paul Valéry]

Paul Valéry, “Politics of the Mind,” 1932:
But to clarify this glimpse into the fiduciary life of the world, founded on
confidence in man and in the future, and to give you a real sense of the very real
importance of the imaginary, I should like to show you how power [potestas]
itself, which is ordinarily thought to result from force [potentia], is essentially a
spiritual value.
Power has only the force we are willing to attribute to it; even the most
brutal power is founded on belief. We credit it with the ability to act at all times
and everywhere, whereas, in reality, it can only act at one point and at a certain
moment. In short, all power is exactly in the position of a bank whose existence
depends on the sole probability (incidentally, very great) that all its clients will not
come at once to draw out their deposits. If, either constantly or at a particular
moment, a certain power were summoned to bring to bear its real force at every
point in its empire, its strength at each point would be about equal to zero.. . . .
Notice too (and this is an even more interesting consideration), that if all
men were equally enlightened, equally critical, and above all equally courageous,
no society would be possible! . . .
Trust, credulity, inequality of intellect, and fear in a thousand forms are
here equally indispensable. And to these essentials must be added greed and
vanity -- and other virtues – the condiments, the psychological accessories to
those psychological bases of society and politics.
5.

6.

7.

The Problem for Mass Democracies
a.
Federal devolution
b.
Interest and affinity groups
Global Institutions: Lost Sense of Participation and Empowerment
a.
Democracy weakened
b.
Less accountability of institutions
Role of the Universal Institutions of the 1940s
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a.
Need for proactive reform
Two Major Strategies
a.
Restructuring the United Nations
b.
Creation of dynamic single-purpose and regional institutions
9.
Reform of the Security Council
a.
Expansion of permanent membership
10.
Regional Institutions
AFRICA (203-05)
1.
Capetown Slums
2.
Khalelitsa
a.
Need for mortgage loans
b.
Lack of neighborhood stores
3.
Financial Engineering
a.
Mass mortgage and financial service markets
LATIN AMERICA (205-09)
1.
Finding Ways to Help Growth
2.
We Should Make Our Immediate Neighborhood an Example
3.
U.S.-Mexico Relations as a Centerpiece
a.
Regional economic integration
4.
First Step: NAFTA and Other Trade Agreements
a.
Trade is not enough
b.
Falling wages
(1)
North-south gap
c.
Result: Domestic problems for the United States
5.
Need to Revisit the Conditions of Illegal Workers
a.
Need to develop ways to ease the path of guest workers
b.
Attention needs to be given to the needs f low-income Americans
c.
Absorption limits
6.
Third Option: Retirement Initiative
a.
Aging retirees
(1)
Escalating cost of retirement housing
b.
Why not encourage the emigration of retirees?
7.
Legal Protections Must Be Negotiated
a.
Favorable tax, customs, insurance, property rights, and inheritance laws
b.
Reimbursement to health care facilities
8.
Advantages to This Kind of Development Policy
a.
Reduce Medicare costs
b.
Pump money into local economies
c.
major investments
9.
Millennial Capitalism at Work: It Is Not Foreign Aid
10.
Its Chief Merit: Giving the Poor Better Access to Capitalism
a.
Development of mortgage markets, etc.
DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (209-10)
1.
Engagement of Civil Society
a.
Need to address the world’s most urgent problems
2.
Private Philanthropy and Faith-Based Charity
THE FUTURE OF MILLENNIAL CAPITALISM (210-12)
1.
Author’s Optimism
a.
9/11 struck while the United States as at a vulnerable point
b.
Critical Stage: the benign features of millennial capitalism were still
relatively underdeveloped
2.
Entrepreneurs Are Promoting the Transition in Their Own Societies
a.
The United States is only the first to shift
b.
France
c.
Diversity of expressions
3.
Cultural and Social Lag
8.

D.

E.

F.

G.
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H.

a.
Mass urbanization
b.
Trade cycle
c.
Historical derailments
4.
The Pace of Change Again Outstrips the Means of Amelioration
a.
Reactionary protest and utopian longing
5.
Hernando de Soto
a.
Microcredit movement
b.
Role of women
c.
The poor need access to capitalism
THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (212-13)
1.
Empowerment of People
2.
Building a New Version of the World System
3.
Standing for Values and Freedom
4.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt
5.
Endicott Peabody
a.
Cui Servire Est Regnare [Who serves, rules]
6.
Jesus

Study Questions
1.

Identify the major interests that defined the 20C American project. Why has it bee easier
for the United States to adjust to the socio-economic transformation of millennial
capitalism? Why is America so unpopular, particularly with foreign political elites?
Thought Question: How does this relate to the secession of elites both at home and
abroad? What are some of America’s non-options? What is the new American task?
What are some of the consequences of the new decentralization of authority? Can
people be equally and fairly represented? What problem does this pose for mass
democracies? What can America do? How does the author propose to restructure the
universal institutions of the late 1940s? (191-203)

2.

What reforms does the author recommend to help lift Africa and Latin America out of
poverty? How can the American people become involved? What reasons does Mead
give for optimism about the future of millennial capitalism? What are some of the
dangers? What does the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto recommend? What
kind of moral guidance was offered by guiding lights of the older establishment, such as
Endicott Peabody? (203-13)
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